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The literature on the quality of democracy has experienced a boom in recent years 
(see, for example, Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Levine and Molina, 2011; Katz and 
Morlino, 2012). The purpose of this paper is to assess the quality of democracy in the 
case of Venezuela under the Hugo Chávez Frías administration (1999–2013).  Scholars 
studying the quality of democracy have not necessarily reached a consensus (Levine and 
Molina, 2012: 158–159). Our assessment is that, at least until the year 2004, Venezuela 
met the minimum procedural requirements to be considered a democratic nation; since 
then, the regime underwent wide-ranging changes and became hybrid in character (Cor-
rales and Hidalgo, 2013). Therefore, a study of democratic quality in Venezuela requires 
analyzing this transition from democracy to hybridity. 
Our evaluation of the quality of democracy is informed by the work of Morlino (2012) 
and Katz and Morlino (2012). According to these authors, democratic quality is defined 
as “a stable institutional structure, allowing its citizens to attain freedom and equality 
though the correct and legitimate functioning of its institutions and mechanisms” (Katz 
and Morlino, 2012: 4).  Based on that idea, our central proposition is that the Chávez 
regime, in the instances in which it did operate as a democracy, exhibited low quality, 
and in the other instances, it functioned with characteristics of authoritarianism. The 
mixture of democracy and authoritarianism, along with elements of low-quality democ-
racy, is Chávez’s primary legacy. 
In the first section, we analyze the most relevant features of procedural variables (po-
litical competition and participation, rule of law, and accountability). We then examine 
freedom, equality, and responsiveness.  
 
 
1. Procedures 
 
Competition 
 
Along with participation, political competition is one of the fundamental engines driv-
ing quality (Diamond and Morlino, 2005). And this element must be present in multiple 
spheres: the party system, political organizations, special interest groups, and other re-
lated forums (Katz and Morlino, 2012: 11). In Venezuela, given the political polarization 
generated by the measures that Chávez took from the beginning of his rule, the level of 
competition has increased—but not without flaws. 
Signs of political polarization have been visible since the formation of two major blocs 
in 1998. On one side, the government party, today called, the United Socialist Party of 
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Venezuela (PSUV), along with some small allied parties, has dominated the political com-
petition within the framework of a barely institutionalized and highly polarized party 
system. The PSUV was created in 2007 following the dissolution of the Fifth Republic 
Movement (MVR).  Since 1998, the government’s party has won in all of the electoral 
processes except for the 2007 constitutional referendum. 
On the other side, the majority of the opposition ended up centered around an elec-
toral coalition, today called Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD).  It formed in 2008. The 
MUD is a coalition of very ideologically heterogeneous parties.  It is a highly pluralistic 
alliance, much more so than the PSUV. Despite its diversity and internal divisions, the 
MUD has managed to achieve unity in every election since the 2010 legislative elections. 
During the Chávez period, no political rotation occurred (see figure 1). Chávez was 
reelected on three occasions (2000, 2006 and 2012) and managed to get the citizens to 
approve a constitutional amendment in 2009 permitting the indefinite reelection of all 
popularly-elected offices (in the 1999 Constitution, only one consecutive reelection was 
possible), becoming the first country in the region to introduce unlimited reelection. 
 
Figure 1. Elections, 2004–2013 
 
Note: In 2010 the votes obtained by the principal opposition coalition were added to those obtained by the party 
Fatherland for All. Source: National Electoral Council. 
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Political competition for congress (the National Assembly) is impaired by a variety of 
factors stemming from electoral system.  First, the system has a majority bias:  although 
it combines the election of representatives by list and by means of a roll-call vote, it 
dissociates the election from both of these by calculating the number of seats corre-
sponding to each party. Furthermore, in the 2009 electoral reform, the number of rep-
resentatives to be elected by roll-call was increased to approximately 70% above the 
national average. The remaining 30% are chosen by list, without establishing any elec-
toral barriers, so that parties can participate in the distribution of seats. Finally, districts 
were reconfigured in eight out of the twenty-three three states plus a Federal District 
that make up the nation, which, in the vast majority of cases, resulted in electoral suc-
cess in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, this gerrymandering did not al-
ways benefitted the ruling party in every district.  That said, on the whole, the reform 
allowed the ruling party to gain comfortable majority, winning a reasonably higher per-
centage of seats relative to its share of the vote (Hidalgo, 2011a). 
The majoritarian effects were observed from 1989 until the 2009 reform.  Although in 
theory a system of personalized proportional representation system was in place, in re-
ality, the ruling party’s effective use of morochas1 (beginning in 2004 regional elections) 
reinforced the majoritarian bias of the system (Molina, 2009: 144–54). The ruling party 
ended up being overrepresented, forcing other powers to initiate agreements or form 
coalitions in order to maximize their probability of gaining representatives. The reform 
in 2009 had the effect of “legalizing” morochas. 
Another factor contributing to diminished competition was the constitutional ban on 
the use of public funds to finance political organizations. Only the financing of publicity 
campaigns was allowed. Because the Constitution and anti-corruption laws prohibit the 
use of public funds, the candidates must gain resources through direct support of sym-
pathizers. And, because no financing law exists, the National Electoral Council (CNE) ap-
proves regulations for each electoral appointment with the objective of controlling the 
campaign money, a goal it did not achieve. The problem was exacerbated due to the lack 
of any regulation in the preliminary campaigns. Meanwhile, the government party fun-
neled state resources into canvassing but received no sanctions. 
The CNE, an institution obligated to apply equitable competition guidelines, was the 
entity charged with regulating the elections. However, its composition was biased: of 
the five rectors who serve as its board, four were clearly pro-ruling party while the other 
 
1 The practice consisted of a party or coalition creating another ad hoc organization (morocha) that was 
formally separate and presented a poll in the electoral circuits. In this way, the parties avoided their number 
of seats being reduced through the plurality/majoritarian system. 
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had connections with the opposition. The CNE did little to control the ruling party’s 
abuses, but it was always strict toward the opposition. 
Additionally, by the time of Chávez’s second term, a deep asymmetry had been estab-
lished in media access through the following mechanisms (Corrales 2015):  1) Legal re-
strictions; 2) closures; 3) heavy fines; 4) intimidation; 5) expansion of state-controlled 
media, including newspapers; and 6) abuse of privilege. 
A new feature of the regime was the expansion of local media outlets, which according 
to some estimates, exceeded 2000 in the year 2010.2 However, these outlets became 
too dependent on the state:   they dependent too much on public funding and most 
frequencies were awarded to sympathetic voices (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 114–145). 
In part, government supporters carried out this media seizure to counteract the scar-
city of pro-government information coming from most private media. Yet, from 2006 
onward, the seizure of public media also stemmed from Chávez’s stated goal of building 
a “communications hegemony” (Bisbal, 2009). 
In short, following Chávez’s death, all public media supported the ruling party, 
whereas private media became a minority and extremely constricted (Committee to Pro-
tect Journalists 2012; Hidalgo, 2011b). Along with Cuba, Honduras, and Paraguay, Vene-
zuela figured among the Latin American countries classified worst in terms of freedom 
of press according to Freedom House.3 
 
 
Political Participation 
 
Participation is the foundation of all democratic systems. In a high-quality democracy, 
citizens participate freely, not only in elections, but also in other formal and informal, 
standard and non-standard, processes in order to influence decision making (Diamond 
and Morlino, 2005: xvi). Under Chávez, some advances were made in terms of participa-
tion, although, due to the political-institutional context, major limitations and obstruc-
tions were created. 
 
2 http://www.derechos.org.ve/2010/05/03/movimiento-para-el-periodismo-necesario-mas-de-2-000-me-
dios-alternativos-y-comunitarios-avalan-el-respeto-de-la-libertad-de-expresion-en-venezuela/. However, 
the number of media outlets enabled by Conatel at the beginning of 2012 did not exceed two hundred 
fifty. (http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/article/conatel-y-medios-comunitarios-afinaron-estrategias-co-
munes). 
3http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Global%20and%20regional%20tables.pdf  
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Chavismo reversed the tendency of the nineties, during which participation in the 
electoral processes decreased significantly (Morgan, 2011). An explosion of socio-politi-
cal participation followed Chávez’s rise (López Maya, 2011). During the initial years 
(1999–2004), when polarization broke out, both the ruling party and the opposition at-
tracted and mobilized a record number of people who turned out to the ballot boxes 
and/or when out to the streets in protest. 
However, after the presidential recall referendum in 2004, which consolidated Chávez 
in power, participation became asymmetrical: the ruling party continued to mobilize 
Venezuelans, attracting a high number of voters to the register (some would say that, 
between 2004 and 2006, the voters register grew by too much to be credible), and they 
won elections (regional in 2004, parliamentary in 2005, and presidential in 2006, the 
latter by a landslide). In contrast, the opposition suffered from serious abstentionism. In 
part, this occurred because many citizens did not believe it was worth the trouble to turn 
out for the vote given that, in their understanding, the government was committing 
fraud, but in part it was also due to demobilizing strategies and poor decisions made by 
opposition leaders (among others, sitting out for the 2005 National Assembly elections). 
After 2007, this asymmetry reversed: abstentionism increased in the ruling party, and 
decreased in the ranks of the opposition. Likewise, the parties’ local headquarters typi-
cally experienced little activity, given that they continued to encounter very low confi-
dence from the citizens. And that trend, in part, translated into low affiliation rates, ex-
cept in the case of the PSUV.4 On the other hand, due to polarization, militants and ac-
tivists met with greater obstacles to carrying out political activities, experiencing risks 
even for physical integrity. And, in the sphere of the ruling party, workers in the public 
sector saw themselves to be “forced,” under threat, to participate in a variety of events.5 
This kind of mandatory involvement compromised the quality of participation. 
Regarding non-standard participation, the key issue is the great socio-political conflict 
that engulfed Venezuela. Under Chávez, and particularly in his final years, the number 
of protests increased (see figure 2) (PROVEA, 2012: 346). The number of protests in the 
last stage was greater than the average over the previous six years, which had to do with 
increased discontentment in response to unfulfilled promises, largely around issues of 
socio-economic rights (about two thirds of the total), versus the high expectations at the 
beginning. 
 
 
4 According to numbers from that party, 7,253,6191 people had been registered by mid-June 2009. See: 
http://www.psuv.org.ve/temas/noticias/PSUV-sobrepaso-los-7-millones-de-inscritos-en-sus-filas/  
5 http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/elecciones-2012/121004/mud-hostigan-a-empleados-
publicos-para-que-asistan-a-acto-de-chavez  
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Figure 2. Protests in Venezuela, 1990–2011 
 
 
Source: Production with data from PROVEA (various years). 
 
 
Limitations on Participation  
 
Before Chávez’s rise, Venezuela’s two traditional parties, AD and COPEI, underwent a 
crisis.  Many of their voters’ defected. Midway through the 2000s, AD recovered some-
what, but not COPEI. In its place, at least three new parties eventually arose: A New Era, 
Popular Will, and Justice First. One of the challenges of this party fragmentation was 
achieving unity during election time. 
At the same time, the ruling party’s control of important social organizations demobi-
lized many Venezuelans, who rejected being “rojo, rojito [red, very red].” Likewise, po-
larization along with some the ruling party’s belligerent discourse generated fear among 
wide sections of the population about discussing politics, leading often to refusal to talk 
or even vote. 
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In the electoral arena, serious failings in representation developed. The first occurred 
after the opposition’s collection of signatures in 2003, calling to bring a presidential re-
call referendum to the CNE. This so-called Tascón list, subsequently revised as the Mai-
santa list, which included the names of millions of Venezuelans who signed the recall 
referendum, was employed by the Executive Branch to discriminate against the signers 
on issues like employment, scholarships, or civil-service contracts. After 2006, the gov-
ernment claimed it was no longer making use of those lists. The opposition then became 
concerned about the use of fingerprint scanners (which authenticate a person’s identity) 
in certain electoral processes. Even though the president of the CNE asserted on several 
occasions that the rule of “one voter, one vote” was followed, that fact that these ma-
chines allowed identities to be traced led voters to mistrust the voting process. 
In other areas, fear, discrimination, and the criminalization of certain activities were 
frequent. For example, in lower-income districts, many citizens (42.6% according to a 
2009 survey by the Centro Gumilla) were afraid to speak openly about politics with their 
neighbors; fear was more prevalent among the middle-lower strata (66.7%) and non-
Chavistas (71.4%) than among Chavistas and the lowest strata (Salamanca, 2011: 18). 
Finally, Chávez created a plethora of social organizations in order to foster social par-
ticipation, but this participation was neither equal nor impartial (López Maya, 2011). 
Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011) performed a detailed study the level of pluralism in 
these organizations; they found that the Bolivarian Circles, the state-affiliated NGOs 
which took control in the mid-2000s, evidenced little presence of non-Chavistas even 
though they managed to gain autonomy from the State, and worse still, they displayed 
an ambivalent attitude toward respecting the rights of their opponents. The study also 
found that the well-known social missions developed an absolute dependency on the 
State, not only in terms of raising funds, but also in decision-making. The staff as well as 
many people participating in the missions worked on behalf of the government party, 
and they were often underqualified, particularly the teachers. 
 
Rule of Law 
 
A high-quality democracy is characterized by a strong rule of law with well evenly reg-
ulated competition, limitations on governmental power, and guarantees afforded to the 
opposition. The processes must be clear, universal, public, and impartial (Diamond and 
Morlino, 2005: xiv–xvi). An independent judiciary is fundamental to preserve the rule of 
law, not just on society, but also on how the state functions. 
In Venezuela, the rule of law was weakened during Chávez, at least along five dimen-
sions:  1) individual security; 2) the judicial system; 3) state capacity; 4) the fight against 
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corruption; and 5) law and order.  With respect to individual security, this became the 
key for most Venezuelans.  Although homicide rates were high before 1998, under Chá-
vez they reached record levels by worldwide standards (OVV).  The number of homicides 
reached 73 people killed per 100,000 in 2012, compared to 25 in 1999. Compared to 
countries with similar income levels, what stands out is not only the high rate of violence 
but also its profound increase during this period (note that the rate for Colombia de-
scends; figure 3). Although there are questions about these figures, no one denies the 
magnitude of crime in Venezuela, including not just killings, but also widespread theft, 
burglary, kidnapping, extortion, etc. 
The Executive Branch implemented several security initiatives (more than 15 by 2012) 
as well as other measures such as passing regulations, improving law enforcement, call-
ing for disarmament, and even creating the Bolivarian National Police (PNB). None of 
these plans generated results. Some have posited that, at root, the problem is a lack of 
political will to confront the problem of security.  A real commitment to security would 
require dealing with criminality inside law enforcement and the judiciary, a step that 
Chávez may not have wanted to take.  
Another relevant issue was the increase in political violence. In relative terms, political 
violence has not been excessive; in fact, the opposition systematically opposes it. Nev-
ertheless, some political violence did occur during one of the periods of greatest conflict 
(2001–2004). Perhaps more concerning was the fact that the government always main-
tained a virulent discourse against detractors, which served to legitimize violence “in the 
name of revolution” by societal actors. Many have asserted that the government ex-
horted civilian groups (colectivos) to use political violence on behalf of the ruling party. 
Chavista “colectivos” controlled specific neighborhoods. And even though Chávez peri-
odically refused to support them, the reality is that many colectivos groups carried out 
their actions with impunity, fueling suspicions that the State welcomed them.  Groups 
of armed civilians also operated with impunity along the border with Colombia, carrying 
out massacres, kidnappings, contract killing, drug trafficking, smuggling, etc. The govern-
ment steadfastly denied providing them with any aid, but some scholars consider that it 
at least tolerated them. 
Venezuela severely reduced the presence of the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) in 2005.  Estimates indicate that drug trafficking out of Venezuela grew dramati-
cally since. Some suggest that drug trafficking was run from the heart of the ruling party, 
with the Soles Cartel being the most cited group.6 Crime rates also undermined property 
rights.  After 2006, when the state launched its heavy nationalization campaign, with 
 
6 http://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile  
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thousands of businesses being expropriated (Paullier, 2012), citizens often responded by 
increasing “invasions” (occupations) of property. All of this helps explain why Venezuela, 
according to the International Property Rights Index (2013), moved to position 129 of 
130 with respect to legal and political environment, 126 in terms of physical property 
rights, and 115 in guaranteeing intellectual property rights. 
 
Figure 3. Homicide Rate among countries, with Gross National Income per capita (purchasing power price levels, 
1995–2010) 
 
 Source: Produced by the authors with data from the UNODC and World Bank. 
 
While corruption and bias in the judiciary preceded Chávez, during histhese flaws 
deepened  (Brewer-Carías, 2010). Under Chávez, the judiciary became partisan; judges 
were fired in large number, unthinkable during the previous period, replaced by provi-
sional judges (Human Rights Watch, 2004). At the end of 2003, only 20% of the 1,732 
Venezuelan judges were permanent (Louza, 2007: 166). The provisional quality caused 
the judges to fear losing their jobs, which undermined the autonomy of the judicial 
branch.  
Low autonomy became worse with the Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice 
(TSJ, 2004), which increased the number of magistrates from twenty to thirty-two and 
gave the NA a large amount of discretion in nullifying the appointments of practicing 
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magistrates. Furthermore, no constitutional tribunal exists as such; instead, a Constitu-
tional Court was created within the TSJ to control the constitutionality of the actions of 
all branches of the State (article 334), which in time became a “super power” informally 
appended to the Executive branch (Brewer-Carías, 2010; PROVEA, 2011: 285–286). In 
2010, to give an example, 24.32% of provisional judges were dismissed, 21.62% of pro 
tem judges, 27.02% of presiding judges, 5.40% of acting judges, and 21.62% of other 
judges (PROVEA, 2011: 287). 
A study of the 45,474 sentences delivered between 2004 and 2013 by the Politico-
Administrative, Electoral, and Constitutional courts of the TSJ concludes that no sen-
tence was ever pronounced against the Government.7 Likewise, although the resources 
dedicated to justice increased as a percentage of the country’s budget (moving from 
2.30% in 2001 to 2.77% in 2012), justice became an instrument of the Executive Branch, 
in clear violation of democratic precepts (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
In the struggle against corruption, the ruling party not only did little, but in fact 
adopted policies that bolstered corruption by expanding statism: it abused public discre-
tional spending and non-audited investments. The excess of regulation in the private 
sector also contributed, especially when it came to the changing and fixing of prices.  
In various indices (World Bank; Corruption Perceptions Index (IPC) by Transparency 
International), Venezuela often ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 
Numerous reports documented the lack of success (plan Bolívar 2000, Central Azucarera 
Ezequiel Zamora, Corpoelec, Metro de Caracas, PDVAL, etc.) In the Follow-up Mecha-
nism of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, of the 113 recommendations 
on 15 subjects that were issued from 2004 onward (third report, 2011), Venezuela had 
only fulfilled 4, made progress in another 12 and had 97 pending.8 
Some believe that corruption was tolerated as a way to create alliances with elite 
groups, such as the “Bolibourgeois,” criminal groups, and sectors of the army (Corrales 
and Penfold, 2011). That is, Chavismo aided the elites as much as or more than the dis-
advantaged. 
Despite its extensiveness, corruption did not figure among the main problems for the 
majority of Venezuelans.9 Instead, Venezuelans expressed concerns with other issues: 
insecurity, unemployment, a variety of economic problems (inflation, scarcity), etc. 
With respect to the military, the typical control by civilians, expected in democratic 
systems, did not exist during Chávez.  Chávez gave power to the military faction in the 
 
7 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/12/12/actualidad/1418373177_159073.html 
8 Transparency of Venezuela: http://www.transparencia.org.ve/Recomendaciones.aspx  
9 http://www.elmundo.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/politica/los-problemas-de-los-venezolanos-no-distin-
guen-col.aspx  
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government coalition and, consequently, in decision-making. In the regional elections 
held in December of 2012, out of the 20 governors elected from the PSUV, 11 were mil-
itary professionals.  
With respect to law enforcement, these elements essentially collapsed in term of ef-
ficiency and respect for human rights. The state also lost its hegemony over law enforce-
ment with the emergence of “colectivos” and semi-official criminal groups. Despite the 
fact that resources were increased and mechanisms for citizen security involving greater 
military presence were implemented, there continued to be a high number of complaints 
continuously (see the Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigations or the National Boli-
varian Armed Forces (FANB).   In short, public actions in matters of citizen security were 
very lacking and sometimes only exacerbated the instability (CIDH, 2013: 425). 
 
Electoral Accountability 
  
Accountability refers to the exchange of responsibilities for potential sanctions be-
tween leaders and citizens. This relationship is complicated and multi-dimensional 
(Schmitter, 2005: 18). Here, we focus on a type of accountability:  the one between citi-
zens and representatives during the electoral processes. As Diamond and Morlino (2005: 
xix) demonstrate, vertical accountability (which includes accountability to different so-
cial actors as well as in the elections) requires effective political competition (Diamond 
and Morlino, 2005: xx).  
In terms of the quality of elections several studies have shown a deterioration in the 
levels of freedom, neutrality, and equitability under Chávez (Kornblith, 2007: 114) (Pe-
reira Almao and Pérez Baralt, 2011). Consequently, Venezuela has been labeled among 
the Latin American countries with one of the lowest-quality elections (Levine and Molina 
2012). Particular issues include: i) the worsening of governmental opportunism and the 
imbalance of resources between government and opposition (Corrales and Penfold, 
2011), ii) the politicization, already mentioned, of the CNE, iii) certain limitations in the 
sphere of liberties. According to one count, 44 types of electoral abnormalities were re-
ported in the electoral processes from 1999 to 2013.10 
Nevertheless, certain improvements in the electoral process have been made. More 
people are now registered to vote (however, it has not been possible to audit voter reg-
istry (Jiménez and Hidalgo, 2014). Improvements were also introduced in the (auto-
mated) voting system, particularly with the reinforcement of oversight, which led to a 
 
10 http://www.americasquarterly.org/electoral-irregularities-under-chavismo-tally  
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greater degree of transparency and trustworthiness in the electoral processes, a visible 
feature since the 2006 presidential elections (Hidalgo, 2009; Corrales and Penfold, 2011).  
Having said that, the 2012 presidential elections, the improvements were partially 
cancelled out with the emergence of many electoral irregularities (Pantin and Mújica, 
2012).  While no one has been able to prove electoral fraud, some studies have found 
anomalous statistical patterns since the 2004 presidential recall referendum. Further-
more, abnormal alterations in the electoral census have been found (Jiménez and Hi-
dalgo, 2014; Hidalgo 2014). This array of electoral irregularities has led organizations like 
Freedom House (starting in 2008) to no longer call Venezuela an “electoral democracy.”  
The restrictions that the ruling party imposed on political competition provided incen-
tives, paradoxically, for the opposition to come together and put forward single candi-
dates (Kornblith, 2013: 54). This led to the decreased levels of volatility among blocs in 
the NA elections. During this period, third-party attempts to break away from the gov-
ernment-opposition dynamic failed; for example, in the 2010 legislative elections, the 
PPT dissociated itself from the ruling party and introduced a less radical socialist bid, but 
this garnered poor results (2 seats out of a total of 165). And the presidential elections 
have remained limited to the real competition between two candidates. 
In short, the ruling party remained unified and organized top-down. Likewise, the op-
position parties had enormous individual weaknesses, but they united to face the most 
critical electoral dates and successfully combatted the tendency toward abstentionism. 
This unity within the opposition, maintained since 2006, is uncommon in the region. 
 
Inter-Institutional Accountability 
 
Inter-institutional accountability is defined as the responsibility of leaders under other 
institutions or actors that have the capability and power to control them (O’Donnell, 
1998: 117). The relationship between the executive and legislative branches suffered a 
profound transformation in comparison with the period before Chávez.  
Relative to the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch enjoyed significant formal 
powers and even greater partisan powers after 1999 (Hidalgo 2009; Corrales and Pen-
fold, 2011).According to an index developed by Javier Corrales (2013), the 1999 Consti-
tution is one of the constitutions in Latin America that granted the most formal powers 
to the Executive branch compared to the Constitution that preceded it. Thereafter, the 
president obtained informal partisan powers:  the NA under the ruling party essentially 
renounced its accountability functions, approving four enabling acts (1999, 2000, 2007 
and 2010). Furthermore, the President also used his power to veto frequently and with-
out challenge.  
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Regarding other state agencies, they too became rubber stamps.  By 2004, the CNE, 
the TSJ, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, and the Ombudsman also lost their in-
dependence.  
Regarding decentralization, with the only exception of subnational elections, the ad-
vances made in the eighties and early nineties were almost entirely reversed under Chá-
vez (Eaton 2013). Beginning in 1989, governors and mayors began to lose financial au-
tonomy, particularly if they were not in the hands of the ruling party. Likewise, the na-
tional state fortified its fiscal control over subnational governments.  And, as a response 
to the electoral headway of opposition sectors in the 2008 regional elections, the state 
took away duties (and thus budgets) exercised by the states on an exclusive basis, par-
ticularly those related to the administration, conservation, and infrastructure (reform of 
the Organic Law of Decentralization, Delimitation and Transfer of Responsibilities of Pub-
lic Authorities, 2009). 
 
 
2. Freedom, Equality, and Responsiveness 
 
Freedom 
 
We now discuss three major types of freedoms: political, civil and social. Respecting 
these freedoms is essential to fortify other democratic features such as participation, 
political competition, and vertical accountability (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: XXV). 
Although important progress in terms of rights was achieved in the 1999 Constitution, 
in practice, flaws in their application were striking.  Regarding the right to life, Venezuela 
not only registered very high homicide rates, but also high rates of extrajudicial execu-
tions, contract killing (particularly of union leaders), impunity of colectivos (civilians 
armed and organized or tolerated by the State), expanding unsafety in prisons, vigilante 
groups across the country, and threats and coercion toward witnesses and their family 
members.  Torture became a common occurrence among police and security forces. 
Provea reports 355 cases of torture during October 1999–December 2012 (PROVEA, 
2013: 290). Few cases were brought to justice. Despite the fact that the Constitution, the 
Penal Code, and several treatises signed by Venezuela prohibit torture, legislation pun-
ishing torture never happened. In addition, Chávez showed himself to be very critical of 
the international system of human rights protection, particularly the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the fall 
of 2012, Venezuela struck down a treatise that involved remaining outside, one year 
later, of the IHR Court’s jurisdiction. 
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Regarding the recognition of past human rights violations, the balance was lacking. 
The failed coup d’état of 2002—which resulted in deaths and hundreds of casualties—
has not been handled satisfactorily. On the one hand, Chávez granted amnesty to per-
sons who had open legal processes.  On the other hand, a variety of people were con-
demned with sentences from three to thirty years for crimes against humanity and insti-
gation of violence in 2009. Opposition sectors have solicited amnesty, which has been 
refused repeatedly.  The ruling party continues to argue that the opposition is involved 
in a “continuous coup.”  
Regarding the proper functioning of justice, one element that stands out is the delay 
in procedures. The situation is more critical with respect to demonstrations and deaths 
in prisons, most of which are extremely over-congested  (PROVEA, 2013: 305). Impunity 
is very widespread: the vast majority of cases investigated by the Public Minstry are nei-
ther processed nor sanctioned. Furthermore, the Ombudsman does little against abuses 
of power (PROVEA, 2013: 310). With respect to procedural guarantees, the mentioned 
case of Judge Afiuni revealed the existence of problems around rape in custody and in-
dictment, once again demonstrating the weakness of the rule of law (IBAHRI, 2014). An-
other issue were cases of civilians subjected to military trial in possible violation of the 
Constitution (article 49, 4th). 
Freedom of information and expression became severely constrained due to the re-
gime’s contempt for pluralism. In particular, a reform to the Penal Code in 2005 imposed 
restrictions on protests and demonstrations, deeming it a criminal offence to show dis-
respect toward public officials. In July of 2010, the TSJ ruled that people who had re-
ceived funds from abroad could be convicted of treason. The Law of Sovereignty pro-
claimed that any person invited by an organization who expresses opinions that offend 
institutions of the State and their authorities or attack the national sovereignty may be 
expelled, and the sponsor organization may be fined.  
Before Chávez, Venezuela was very tolerant toward educational pluralism. Under Chá-
vez, this tolerance suffered a decline. The new Organic Law of Education in 2009 con-
ferred powers onto the State and contained loopholes that could jeopardize the auton-
omy of private education. Chávez also tried to eliminate the autonomy of universities; 
he did not accomplish this end, but he was able to reduce their budgets and create al-
ternative universities. The government established and financed affinity groups within 
the public universities to compete, often successfully, for positions of responsibility. Fre-
quently, these party-line groups carried out obstructionist or aggressive actions against 
independent or opposition groups. In December of 2011, after suffering an electoral de-
feat in the elections of the Central University of Venezuela (CUV), Chavista groups incited 
violence without facing any consequences under the law. 
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Regarding unions, the effort to work exclusively with only government-loyalists was 
striking.  Unions were some of the most important groups to challenge Chávez in the 
2001-2004 period.  Since then, rather than negotiate with unions, the government at-
tempted to create party-line unions and, at the same time, exclude independent ones 
from any type of decision making.  The conflict between State and non-party-line unions 
gave rise to an increase in union protests.  
In addition, restrictions were placed on the activities of NGOs.  The Law for the De-
fense of Sovereignty (2010) prohibits individuals and organizations from receiving finan-
cial contributions from external sources. Note that the Executive Branch, in violation of 
this same law, made use of loans from the Chinese government to carry out discretional 
and political spending. 
In the treatment of minority rights, the best accomplishment is probably the legal 
treatment of indigenous communities.  It’s a minority community of approximately  
725,128 people according to the 2011 census, and thus, no more than 3 percent of the 
total population. For this historically marginalized community, fundamental rights were 
laid down in the 1999 Constitution (Preamble, art. 100, 126) (Angosto, 2008). Neverthe-
less, at the end of the Chávez period, a large disparity still existed between what was 
proclaimed and the government policies in health and protection of their collective own-
ership of their lands (PROVEA, 2013). 
Important declines in political freedoms occurred as well (Human Rights Watch, 
2012):   
Restrictions on leaders elected from the opposition: For the 2008 regional elections, 
the ruling party responded by increasing political restrictions on opposition leaders. The 
government increased the number of administrative disqualifications of candidates, all 
without due process. Although the opposition still managed to win the governorships of 
several important states, the government responded by denying resources, stripping 
them of powers, or preventing them from taking office by accusing them of corruption 
(see table 1).  
 
Freedoms within the government party.  
 
Whereas the opposition became more democratic in terms of procedures, making in-
creased use of open and competitive elections to choose its candidates, the ruling party 
became more vertical and submissive toward the President. Several times, Chávez nom-
inated electoral candidates at whim, without elections and with very little consultation 
with the base. In fact, certain political liberties were taken inside the ruling party, includ-
ing violating the law, and openings may have existed for new groups to participation 
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politically.  Within the PSUV freedom to question the ruler ceased to exist. By 2012, Chá-
vez was already naming leaders and making every form of decision that concerned the 
party; open primaries, as such, were not held.  
Freedom of electoral campaigns. On election day, there was low probability of fraud 
in the counting of votes. However, the opposition saw itself increasingly surrounded by 
formal obstacles, restrictions on financing, harassment of its main constituents, and 
demonstrations of aggression on the part of the ruling party. 
Secrecy of the vote: The worst violations toward the secrecy of the vote were commit-
ted between 2004 and 2006 (Jatar, 2006). The government made use of the previously 
mentioned Tascón List, which had the names of those who signed in favor of a recall 
referendum against the President, to determine who would receive assistance/subsidies 
and public employment. In 2005, the opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections 
after learning that voter identity was not protected. Since then, protections improved 
(Veneconomía, 2012).  The government declared that it was no longer using the list of 
signers, and the CNE carried out a more open effort to decrease the probability that 
fingerprint scanners could be used to connect voters to their votes. One testament to 
the progress made in voter identity protection is that the opposition participated in and 
accepted the results of every election that took place from 2006 until 2012. The opposi-
tion even made use of the CNE to authenticate the results of the MUD primaries in 2012. 
Despite the fact that the voter identity protection improved for the opposition, it de-
clined for members of the ruling party. The government forced—and even physically 
transported—public employees to attend political rallies and polling places (Rivera and 
Zerpa, 2013). In the 2012 presidential elections, the PSUV controlled lists of people re-
quired to vote for Chavism, and they were mobilized to seek them out and take them to 
the polling stations (Rosales, 2012). 
 
Equality 
 
The equality of political rights (among those who encounter non-discrimination by 
gender, religion, ideology, race, etc.) has a clear impact on other features such as ac-
countability, participation and freedoms (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: XXVII). In Vene-
zuela, there was improvement in economic equality (at least until 2012), but not in po-
litical equality. 
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Table 1: Restrictions on governors/mayors elected from the opposition, 2008 
 
Leader Profile Restriction 
Leopoldo López Mayoral Candidate for Caracas Disqualified 
Antonio Ledezma Mayor of Caracas “Unique Authority” office created, 
overriding the mayor’s office. 
Henrique Capriles Governor of Miranda 40 percent of budget denied and hos-
pitals were nationalized. 
Manuel Rosales Mayor Elect of Maracaibo Accusation of corruption forces him 
to abandon the country. 
Morel Rodríguez Governor of Nueva Esparta (Margarita) Nationalization of ports 
Henrique Salas Feo Governor of Carabobo Nationalization of Puerto Cabello 
César Pérez Vivas Governor of Táchira Creation of a parallel government: 
Government Revolutionary Council, 
directed by Rafael Ramírez (Feb. 
2010). The territory can be declared a 
warzone at any time since it is a bor-
der state.  
Pablo Pérez Governor of Zulia State  See previous 
Jorge Barboza            Mayor of Zulia State Election voided 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
 
Chávez made the Venezuelan economy even more dependent on the petroleum in-
dustry. No other case exists in Latin America of so much dependence on a single sector 
Javier Corrales, Manuel Hidalgo, The quality of the Venezuelan Democracy 
 
107 
 
(Monaldi, 2013). By 2012, the energy sector represented 11% of the GDP, 42% of fiscal 
revenues, and 96% of exports (Economic and Commercial Office of the Spanish Embassy, 
2013: 4). During the period from 2003–2008, the country experienced an oil boom 
greater than that of any other country in the region (Monaldi). That government used 
the boom in oil prices to set expansive fiscal policies, including various social programs, 
contributing to a significant increase in consumption and a decrease in economic ine-
quality and poverty. According to the government, “social investment” as a percentage 
of total public investment increased from 55.4 percent in 2002 to 70.7 percent in 2011 
(INE, 2012). That is, social spending grew both in absolute terms (thanks to greater pe-
troleum incomes) and in relative terms (due to the government’s emphasis on social 
spending). The middle class (defined as homes with a per capita income of at least $10 
but not belonging to the wealthiest 5% of the nation), which suffered one of the most 
brutal declines in the region—falling from 21% to 3% of the population between 1990 
and 2005 (Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod, 2011)—recovered under Chávez. The change in 
the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, is -0.24 percent annually for Venezuela 
between the years 2000 and 2008 (Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod, 2011: 2). A negative 
value in this percentage indicates a decrease in inequality. Economic inequality between 
the wealthiest 20% and the rest of the population declined (figure 4). And, drawing from 
CEPAL, a considerable recovery with respect to the middle classes occurred as well (Gon-
zález, 2014). Additionally, several poverty indices also indicated progress; the number of 
“poor homes” and “homes in extreme poverty” descended from 43.9 and 17.1 percent 
respectively to 21.2 and 6.0 percent between the ends of 1998 and 2012 (INE). 
It must be emphasized, however, that Venezuela’s income inequality performance is 
not as striking in comparative terms. According to Birdsall, Lustig, and McLeod (2011): 
a) Of the 13 Latin American countries that improved inequality between 2000 and 
2008, Venezuela obtains the lowest value.  
b) Venezuela only managed to improve the level of inequality and raise it to pre-crisis 
levels. Venezuela’s Gini coefficient in 1992 was 0.41, it reached its peak in 2002 during 
Chávez’s government (0.48), and it went down once again to 0.43 in 2006. By 2012, as 
we have already noted, it was placed slightly lower than in 1992. 
c) Other countries decreased inequality levels to their lowest figures in history. Brazil 
had a Gini of 0.60 in 1992 and decreased progressively to 0.54 in 2009. Chile had a Gini 
of 0.55 in ’92 and descended to 0.52 in 2009. 
d) Although Venezuela’s Gini index was the lowest, other countries were more effi-
cient, in relative terms, in the reduction of inequality. The decrease of 0.24 percent in 
the Gini was lower than the average of -0.58% among 17 Latin American countries over 
the same period. 
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Figure 4. Home income quintiles. 1st semester 1998 – 1st semester 2012 
 
Source: INE 
 
The Chávez administration adhered to two types of social policies that were at odds 
with one another. On one hand, they pursued one of the highest social-spending levels 
in Latin America, although this is difficult to quantify precisely given that a large part of 
the spending was not very transparent, the same as the revenues. It is estimated that, 
during the period from 1999 until 2012, Venezuela received a total of US$699,500 million 
in revenue from petroleum exports, a historic record both for the country and for the 
region (Puente, 2014). On the other hand, the government incurred one of the highest 
inflation rates in the world, seven currency devaluations (see Olivares, 2013), an excess 
of bureaucracy, and little attention to the quality of services provided (Rodríguez 2008; 
Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod, 2011; Corrales, 2010). Thus, many some experts in social 
policy (España, 2013) attribute improvements in poverty to simply the magnitude of the 
oil windfall more than with the impact of social policies.   
The great mystery of Venezuela’s poverty, inequality, education, and health indicators 
is not so much whether they improved (which they did from 2000 until 2008), but rather 
why they did not differ more from regional and even global tendencies, particularly con-
sidering that Venezuela was earning its greatest export revenues in history. The return-
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investment ration was very unfavorable. Another puzzle is why the government placed 
so little emphasis on environmental issues, an issue evidenced by damage to the envi-
ronment and a decrease in biodiversity (for example, see PROVEA, 2013). 
Chávez’s food policies were also at odds with one another (Howard-Hasmann, 2013). 
On one hand, Chávez increased food subsidies and created food distribution apparatuses 
at low cost (e.g., Mercal, PDVAL). Furthermore, the government promoted the importa-
tion of food, thus supplying nutritional needs at good prices. However, the Executive 
Branch implemented a policy of nationalizing lands and food businesses, many of which 
remained or became unproductive. Likewise, it applied an excess of regulations on the 
economy (exchange rate, wholesale and retail prices, and labor market) that brought 
about a decrease in national productivity. By the end of the Chávez period, Venezuela 
had serious rates of shortage in a number of important dietary items such as milk, beans, 
sardines, and also in basic consumer items such as toilet paper, striking sectors with the 
least resources most severely (Landaeta-Jiménez et al., 2012). If it had not been for the 
policy of opening the country to imports, Venezuela would have faced a food crisis as 
serious as what Maduro is dealing with now. 
Regarding to issues of social equality based on gender and sexual orientation, the pro-
gress is also mixed.  The laws became more favorable, but any initiative supported by a 
non-loyalist group was rejected.  The 1999 Constitution has been praised (and criticized) 
for employing neutral language in when referring to gender. At least 14 articles in the 
constitutional text support or establish rights for women (Rakowski and Espina, 2011). 
The 2007 gender law confers new rights to women. The percentage of women in the 
government during Chávez’s last presidential term went from 18.5% in 2007 to close to 
41.5% at the beginning of 2012, mainly Chávez supporters (García Prince, 2012: 5–6). By 
2010, in the TSJ, women represented 36 percent of the total, one of the highest percent-
ages in Latin America (Kalantry, 2012: 84). 
However, very few of the proposed bills advocated by feminist groups—such as 
housewives’ right to pensions, gender quotas, or depenalization of abortion—gained any 
traction. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Rakowski and Espina (2008) found that 
women make up more than half of those benefitting from the missions, the benefits did 
not come without costs. An important example is that a great deal of time and effort 
was demanded of women, including their giving a subsidy to the State, instead of the 
reverse. Furthermore, in many cases, the women who worked for the government also 
were politically engaged before Chávez’s time, so that it is remains unclear how much 
new empowerment occurred, and problems like gender violence were not addressed. 
Likewise, women confronted obstacles in areas such as education, health, housing, and 
work; in particular, there were high rates of informality and wage disparity in the labor 
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market, which persisted, even if they were reduced, in higher education (Venezuelan 
Observatory of Women’s Human Rights). And in the public sphere, discrimination by 
gender also remained. Even though women represent 50% of the electoral census, there 
continued to be a low percentage of women in government offices, representative bod-
ies, and political organizations. 
The situation concerning rights for the LGBT community was very unfavorable, espe-
cially compared to high-income countries in the Americas (see table 2). By the end of the 
2000s, more than 50 percent of gay or lesbian people, and more than 80 percent of 
transsexuals, had suffered violence at the hands of the police (Forum for Human Rights 
and Democracy in Venezuela, 2010). The ruling party rejected the idea of establishing a 
tenet against discrimination by sexual orientation (Merentes, 2010). From that time on-
ward, neither the courts nor the NA did much to expand LGBT rights during Chávez’s 
government. The NA blocked initiatives from LGBT groups that sought improved laws 
against discrimination for sexual orientation or gender identity, and no official policy ex-
isted in the areas of education, employment discrimination, police activity, and health 
services. There was a Chavist and pro-LGBT mayor in Caracas, but that did not produce 
large legal or institutional advancements; the judiciary never saw a case about hate 
crime. 
To fight against racial discrimination, Chavism drove a series of laws and initiatives 
with the participation of Afro-Venezuelan movements. Among the most important, the 
passage of a Law Against Discrimination (2011) is particularly significant. Additionally, in 
the 2011 census, the Government identified persons of African descent. We do not 
know, however, the scope of these measures in terms of inclusion. 
Finally, a word about political equality in the National Assembly. A politically equitable 
system would maintain more or less even correlation between votes and representation. 
However, in Venezuela, we encounter the opposite: there is a huge disparity between 
opposition votes and representation in the NA. In the 2010 elections, for instance, the 
opposition carried a majority in the number of votes yet obtained a significant minority 
of seats (Table 3). 
This disproportion was due mainly to two factors. The first of these was malappor-
tionment.  Since the 1999 Constitution, the electoral system provides Venezuela’s most 
populous states with fewer representation in the NA, measured according to seats per 
inhabitants. Each state, regardless of its population, receives three seats. This gives an 
advantage to the less populous states, which ultimately became an advantage for the 
ruling party given that since 2006 it dominated the rural/less populous Venezuelan 
states. According to Monaldi, Obuchi and Guerra (2010), if the system had been more 
proportional, the opposition would have obtained seventeen more representatives.  
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Table 2. LGBT rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011. 
 
Ranking* Country 
Very favorable 
 (10–14 points) 
Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
Favorable 
 (5–7 points) 
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Puerto Rico, British Virgin Islands 
Somewhat favorable  
(3–4 points) 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, Aruba, The 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Turks and Caicos 
Unfavorable (less than 2 
points) 
Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ja-
maica, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
*Note: This ranking is based on seven categories related to LGBT legal rights: legislation with respect to 
homosexual sexual activity, recognition of homosexual unions, right to equal marriage, right of LGBT 
persons to adopt, participation in military forces, laws for protection against discrimination, rights for 
gender identity. The information derives from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_by_coun-
try_or_territory. 
Source: Corrales, Crook and Pecheny (2011).  
 
The second factor is the exacerbation of disproportionality that was introduced by the 
2009 electoral reform. Under the previous system of personalized representation, the 
disproportionality would have been relatively acceptable (4.7%), but with the implemen-
tation of the new electoral system it raised to 11.4% in 2010 (Molina 2010). Contrary to 
expectations, as we have indicated previously, the manipulation of districts (gerryman-
dering) in 2009 did not produce very favorable results for the ruling party in the 2010 
elections; the winnings were minor. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of votes and seats. 2010 Parliamentary elections 
  
                                 Votes (%)                  Seats (%) 
Ruling Party  48.1    59.4 
Opposition  51.9   40.6 
Source: Monaldi, Obuchi and Guerra (2010) 
 
Responsiveness 
 
Responsiveness is generally understood as the extent to which a government executes 
policies that satisfy and take into account citizen demands (Bingham Powell, Jr., 2005: 
62). In this sphere, the case of Venezuela casts both light and shadows. 
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The vast majority of Venezuelans supports democracy, and that support has grown 
stronger during the period under review. Moreover, the data from Latinobarómetro and 
other national pollsters revealed that the majority rejects the establishment of a com-
munist regime like that of Cuba (for example, 81% according to the omnibus survey by 
Datanálisis, March 2012). Therefore, an ideological and mental dissonance exists be-
tween the radical leadership on the part of the Chavist elite, Chávez himself among them 
(62% of described him as radical leftist in spring 2009), and the population, only a small 
percentage (20%) of whom self-identify as radical leftists (Keller and Associates, 2009). 
Furthermore, a significant percentage believed that the regime was only slightly or not 
at all democratic (in 2011, on the 1–5 scale, it placed at 24%; 33% in 2007), those identi-
fying with Chavism certainly responding less critically. 
The evaluation of various important institutions’ and actors’ roles has fluctuated in 
recent years. However, studies of public opinion have shown relatively low confidence 
in the main public actors. And an even poorer opinion was held of the political parties, 
the unions, and the government/ministers versus other private actors such as the busi-
ness community. 
Under Chávez, the polls demonstrated that many citizens distinguished between the 
role of the government/ministers and the President. The latter began his rule with an 
approval rating greater than 90%. By December 2001, his approval rating had fallen 
down to 35%, due to his highly authoritarian initial measures. It remained at levels below 
40% for a few years, with the exception of the days following the coup d’état in April of 
2002. With the implementation of social missions in 2003 and the context of a petroleum 
boom, approval rating levels increased significantly until placing at an average of 71.5% 
in 2006. After the failed bid for constitutional reform in 2007, the President did not re-
cover his previous levels of approval. Nevertheless, the positive evaluation remained 
around 50–60%, and he would be very popular at the time of his death, after more than 
a decade in power. 
After the year 2011, there is a notable increase in dissatisfaction toward the Presi-
dent’s management in particular areas. Except for the missions (52.6% positive evalua-
tion in July of that year), less than half approved of his management in other policies 
(electricity, housing, clinics, food, economic situation, corruption, insecurity, etc.). The 
dissatisfaction with the government’s work led to an increase in protests. Polarization 
meant that the executive branch was capable of responding to the demands of its fol-
lowers, yet, with few exceptions, it disregarded the majority of the demands coming 
from the opposition. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
We have traced the evolution of democracy during the Chávez period, reviewing some 
of the most specialized literature relevant to each domain.  In our view, retrogression is 
evident. In many aspects, the regime turned autocratic, and in those aspects that re-
mained democratic, the record points toward very low quality.   
There are two ways of viewing Chávez’s Venezuela. One is to be astonished at the 
deterioration of democracy. The other is to be surprised by the fact that the government, 
despite its electoral victories, institutional hegemony, and control of resources did not 
become more authoritarian by the time of Chávez’s death (Corrales, 2015; Alarcón, Ál-
varez and Hidalgo, 2016). Each way of seeing the case offers different possible interpre-
tations.  
The first interpretation is that the Venezuelan case shows how easy it is for a demo-
cratic backslide to occur.  Venezuela after all had some of the strongest and longest dem-
ocratic traditions in Latin America, a fairly high income per capita, and a sophisticated 
civic life. If this backslide happened in Venezuela, then it is fair to say that it could happen 
in many other countries as well.  The other interpretation is to say that Venezuela’s lib-
eral-social-democratic tradition was still strong enough to contain the populist assault 
from above, at least to some extent. It also demonstrated that multiple institutional fo-
rums and political actors still existed (even within Chavismo) that were able to impede 
the executive branch in its effort to assemble all spheres in order to construct a socialist 
model. Either way, what is clear is that democratic quality in Venezuela under Chávez 
eroded, and in some areas, though not all, democratic life essentially disappeared.     
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